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ABSTRACT
Private military and security companies (PMSCs) are a fast-growing global industry. While the
rise of PMSCs and their activities have attracted much media coverage and growing scholarly
attention, little is known about their sourcing of masses of military labour from the global
South. This exploratory study examines the case of Fiji, whose thousands of ex/current disci-
plinary force personnel and unemployed men have been contracted by PMSCs to provide
security work in Iraq and other high-conﬂict areas. The article shows this to be an instance of
unequal core-periphery military labour trade, outlining its scale, processes and impacts on the
migrants. It also illuminates how the migrants’ collective agency is demonstrated even under
powerful structural constraints.
INTRODUCTION
While mercenaries have existed for centuries, today’s private military and security companies
(PMSCs)1 emerged in the early 1990s, “driven by three dynamics: the end of the Cold War, trans-
formations in the nature of warfare that blurred the lines between soldiers and civilians, and a gen-
eral trend toward privatisation and outsourcing of government functions” (Singer, 2005). PMSCs,
although presented as civilian security providers, have not only taken over support functions such
as transport, logistics and maintenance from militaries, but also provided armed protection to indi-
viduals and sites, and undertaken armed security operations akin to those conducted by military
forces (Bjork and Jones, 2005).
PMSC combat operations in Angola and Sierra Leone drew much attention in the 1990s, fol-
lowed by a surge in the use of PMSCs by the US and coalition governments in Afghanistan and
Iraq in the wake of the US-led invasions. 30,000 and 24,000 armed contractors were in Iraq and
Afghanistan respectively in 2010 (Krahmann, 2012). Today, with the American/coalition forces
withdrawing from Iraq and Afghanistan, the security vacuum is being ﬁlled by PMSCs, who con-
tinue to ﬁnd extensive demand especially for private-sector protection (Sen, 2015). Del Prado
(2008) estimates the industry’s annual yield at US$100–120billion.
There has been considerable journalistic coverage and civilian protest concerning PMSC activi-
ties, especially incidents of abuse and other transgression. This is paralleled by growing scholarly
literature investigating the growth of PMSCs as a manifestation of Western state-corporate expan-
sionism (Whyte, 2003), their impact on peacebuilding/peacekeeping (Bjork and Jones, 2005; Bray-
ton, 2002), their ambiguous legality and regulatory frameworks (Krahmann, 2012) and the
accountability of their conduct (Peters, 2006; Francis, 1999). Recently, Fraser (2013) shed new
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light on the industry by highlighting PMSC personnel’s vulnerability to the companies’ “coercive
offers”. The industry has been, however, discussed predominantly as a Western corporate phe-
nomenon, with limited attention to its workers from the global South. We argue that a reality-con-
gruent understanding of PMSCs requires greater attention to the extensive involvement of military
labour from the “periphery” recruited by transnational companies headquartered in the “core”.
Pioneering studies by Chisholm (2014a, b), Stachowitsch and Chisholm (2016) and others
(e.g. Eichler, 2015) provide critical analyses of the gendered and racialised hierarchies repro-
duced by PMSCs’ global recruitment practices from feminist, masculinities studies and postcolo-
nial perspectives. Of particular relevance is Chisholm’s (2014a, b) work which illuminates,
among others, PMSC treatment of Gurkhas as second class to Western personnel emanating
from their marginalized labour market position and colonially-constructed status as racially
underdeveloped subjects. We aim to contribute to this emerging literature by exploring the
voices and experiences of Fijians contracted by PMSCs for deployment in conﬂict zones. Simi-
lar to the Gurkhas, Fijians are amongst those categorised as a “martial race”, which makes Fiji
a key PMSC labour supplier along with Nepal, Uganda and Kenya (Stachowitsch and
Chisholm, 2016). Furthermore, like the Gurkhas, Fijians experience highly exploitative and
physically and psychologically consequential relations with PMSCs, which has received scant
research attention. By focusing on Fijian experience, we provide further empirical knowledge of
the industry’s recruitment of and effects on global South military/security labour as well as
draw some theoretical insights from this knowledge.
Fiji is a Paciﬁc island nation that has undergone multiple economic challenges due mainly to
political instability (coups d’etat in 1987, 2000, and 2006) and external shocks. The average annual
GDP growth dropped from 5.5 per cent in the 1970s to 0.8 per cent in the 2000s (Prasad, 2012).
Only 40 per cent of the labour force is in the formal sector, and of this, only 36 per cent is in con-
tinuous paid employment (ADB, 2012). Forty-ﬁve per cent of the population lives in poverty (Nar-
sey, 2014). In this context, migration to metropolitan countries, beginning around the 1970s, has
become an important source of employment and remittances (Mohanty, 2006; Connell, 2006;
Voigt-Graf, 2008, Kaitani, et al., 2011). Earlier migration was mostly permanent and dominated by
Fijians of Indian descent, especially following the 1987 and 2000 ethno-nationalist coups. Since
the 1990s, an increasing number of indigenous Fijians have been migrating, often temporarily, for
remittance-generating purposes. These include Fijians recruited by the British Army (BA), Republic
of Fiji Military Forces (RFMF) soldiers on United Nations (UN) and other peacekeeping missions,
nurses, other health workers, rugby players, and PMSC personnel.
Researchers have studied the characteristics and impacts of Indo-Fijian emigration (e.g. Pangerl,
2007; Voigt-Graf, 2005) and temporary migration of skilled workers such as nurses and teachers
(e.g. Reddy et al., 2004; Voigt-Graf et al., 2007). Extensive attention has also been given to the
impact of remittances on social protection and migration intentions (Jimenez and Brown, 2013;
Leeves, 2009; Kaitani, et al., 2011), political instability as a migration determinant (Narayan and
Smyth, 2003) and human capital loss as an emigration cost (Reddy et al, 2004; Chandra, 2004). In
other words, the existing literature centres around the patterns, intentions, beneﬁts and costs of
(skilled) migrations, with an emphasis on their development impacts. PMSC personnel movement
has received limited discussion, despite some researchers noting it as one of the largest contempo-
rary indigenous Fijian migrations (Voigt-Graf, 2008; Connell, 2006). The only detailed investiga-
tion is presented in Maclellan’s (2006) journalistic study on a rising number of Fijian military
migrants in the mid-2000s. Most of the existing documentation is in the Fijian mass media, espe-
cially two national newspapers, which in the early 2000s gave prominent coverage to PMSC per-
sonnel deaths, injuries and recruitment disputes.
In this article, we present an exploratory study to outline the scale, processes, and impacts of
Fijian PMSC personnel migration to conﬂict zones through the eyes of the migrants. Our discus-
sion is guided by the following research questions:
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1. What are the scale and processes of Fijian PMSC personnel migration to high-conﬂict zones?
2. What are the major characteristics and impacts of this migration from the migrants’ perspec-
tive?
3. How do the migrants negotiate and respond to migratory challenges?
4. What does the above tell us about the mechanism of global private military/security labour
trade and its effects on global South military/security labourers?
It should be noted that the study focuses speciﬁcally on PMSC personnel migration to high-con-
ﬂict areas, especially Iraq, although Fijians have been employed as security personnel in various
other countries and in non-conﬂict areas, including Papua New Guinea and Australia. Our analysis
is informed by Wallerstein’s (2004) World Systems Theory as a broad perspective to understand
the structural context, but not as a rigid framework disregarding migrants’ agency. The core-periph-
ery model has been widely applied to migration research in the past, providing a conceptual frame-
work for analysing labour mobility within “the structure of economic forces in core and periphery
[which] . . . condition migrants to sell their labour in places where needed and at the cheapest pos-
sible price” (Portes, 1978: 1). This has been prominent in discussions of “brain (and brawn) drain”,
underdevelopment and other detrimental migration impacts (e.g. Papademetriou, 1985; Binford,
2003). More recently, there has been a shift since the 2000s from “neo-Marxist pessimism” towards
more optimistic estimations of migration, especially the role of remittances in poverty reduction
and economic growth (de Haas, 2010). Nevertheless, we will demonstrate below that understanding
PMSC procurement of Fijian military/security labour requires an analytical framework which
accounts for the structural conditions of global private military/security labour trade.
Simultaneously, we acknowledge the limitations of deterministic models and the need for a mul-
ti-layered approach. We take note of the tendency in research until recent years to give primary
attention to economic structural dynamics of migration (Pajo, 2008). While we highlight the struc-
tural inequities shaping PMSC personnel migration, especially in light of the current migration opti-
mism and remittance research boom, we seek to understand how such processes and consequences
are played out, experienced and negotiated “on the ground”. Our goal is to understand the power
dynamics of PMSC personnel migration through migrants’ lived experiences. This approach is
informed by de Haas’s argument (2010: 241) that “an improved theoretical perspective on migra-
tion and development has to be able to account for the role of structure - the constraining or
enabling general political, institutional, economic social, and cultural context in which migration
takes place - as well as agency - the limited but real capacity of individuals to overcome constraints
and potentially reshape structure.”
METHODS
We employed two qualitative data collection methods. First, we conducted 18 semi-structured inter-
views between July 2015 and May 2016 with 12 PMSC personnel and four wives of PMSC person-
nel, including the widow of a man killed on duty. The men’s ages ranged between 36 and 67. All
had been employed in Iraq between 2003 and 2014, while ﬁve had also worked elsewhere such as
Afghanistan. The interviewees were recruited through a snowball sampling method. The interviews
were conducted in English, and the transcribed data were put to thematic coding, which identiﬁed
salient themes and concepts guided by the research questions. The interview data will be quoted in
indented paragraphs or in inverted commas, with the interviewees referred to by pseudonyms. Sec-
ond, due to the scarcity of previous research, we examined all issues of the Fiji Times, the daily
newspaper which has historically had the largest circulation, dated from January 2000 to June 2016,
and selected issues of the other daily newspaper the Fiji Sun, to collect relevant information. Addi-
tionally, the Fiji Bureau of Statistics, RFMF and BA were contacted for relevant statistics.
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FIJI’S HISTORY OF “MUSCLE TRADE” AND PMSC PERSONNEL MIGRATION
Fiji has a long history of military “muscle trade” originating from its involvement in the World
Wars, especially World War II, where 8,000 Fijians joined the Allied forces in the Solomon
Islands, and gained a reputation for bravery (Lal, 1992). This was followed by the Malayan War,
when Fiji sent 1,600 troops to the Commonwealth forces. Following 1970 independence, Fiji’s mil-
itary labour migration accelerated through three main channels: 1) UN and other multilateral peace-
keeping missions; 2) BA intake; and 3) PMSCs.
Fiji’s participation in peacekeeping operations started in 1978 with the UN Interim Force in
Lebanon, which has been followed by various other missions. Today a total of 1,040 peacekeeping
personnel are sent annually (RFMF, 2016, personal communication). Indeed, Fiji has sent more sol-
diers on a per capita basis on UN peacekeeping missions than any other nation (Siegel and Feast,
2014). The participation in these, along with the war involvement, has established an international
reputation for Fijian soldiery and engendered national pride in this reputation. Furthermore, it has
become a major source of employment and remittances, reportedly earning Fiji well over US
$300million since 1978 (Siegel and Feast, 2014).
Recruitment of Fijians into the BA started in 1961/1962 (Ware, 2012). It accelerated in the late
1990s and early 2000s, reaching an annual intake of 490 in 2001/2002. The numbers however
dropped from the late 2000s onwards. In 2009 the recruitment was suspended due to Fiji’s post-
coup political condition (Paciﬁc Islands Development Program/East-West Centre, 2009), followed
by the BA’s downsizing policy in 2011. The 2014/2015 intake was just 10. Nevertheless, a total of
2,740 Fijians have joined BA since 1998/1999 (BA, 2016, personal communication).
PMSC employment is the latest phase in Fiji’s military labour migration history, which started
around the early 2000s. Our interview data and media documentation show that Global Risk had
Fijians deployed in Iraq in 2003, coinciding with the US-led invasion. Since then, thousands of
(mostly indigenous) Fijian men (and a few women) have been contracted by mainly US- and UK-
based PMSCs to work as “security guards” in Iraqi (and some Afghan) cities, with some in sup-
portive roles in Kuwait in engineering, mechanical, and information technology (World Bank,
2006). Our interviewees have been employed by Global Risk (UK), Control Risks (UK), G4S
(UK), SIS (UK), SOC (US), Total Defence Logistics (UK), Triple Canopy (US), Titan Security
Services (UK), Olive Group (UAE), Kulak Construction (Turkish), EOD Technology (US), and
Reed (US). Although the term “security guard” is commonly used in Fiji to describe their work,
many engage in armed services, especially convoy security, security escorts and personal security
details. In 2003, many were recruited to provide transportation and/or security for Iraqi’s currency
exchange.2
No ofﬁcial record exists of the exact scale of this migration. However, it is possible to make a
rough estimation of the PMSC migrant numbers between 2006 and 2011 with statistics obtained
from relevant authorities. With advice from the Fiji Bureau of Statistics, armed force emigrant
statistics were used as a baseline, from which the numbers of discipline force emigrants (i.e. peace-
keeping troops and BA intakes) were deducted (see Table 1). While the remaining ﬁgures may
include a small number of military migrants unaccounted for, they provide a useful indication of
the scale of PMSC personnel migration.
These numbers indicate that during this period Fiji sent more PMSC personnel than peacekeeping
troops, the country’s primary military labour export. Furthermore, while these statistics show 2006
as the peak year with approximately 1,550 emigrants, our interview data and media documentation
suggest that 2006 is in fact the year when PMSC recruitment numbers began to decline. The early
2000s numbers are hence speculated to have been even higher. According to 2005 media coverage,
several PMSCs had over 700 Fijians deployed in Iraq and planned to recruit hundreds more. Fiji’s
Elections Ofﬁce counted 4,000 Fijians in Iraq in 2006 (Rina, 2006), with the majority likely to
have been PMSC personnel.
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Most personnel have prior discipline force experience (see Table 2). Many were in the military’s
territorial force or resigned from the military/police forces to take up PMSC contracts, the duration
of which varies widely, from a few months to a few years. There are two main pathways for
PMSC migration. First, many PMSCs previously had local recruitment agents facilitating enlistment
and despatch. In 2005, there were ﬁve such agencies. While this has dropped to just one today, it
is possible to apply online with some PMSCs. Second, once the recruits reach Iraq, many attempt
to secure their next contract with another company while still abroad, anticipating contract expiry
or following disputes with employers. Fijians contracted by various companies actively assist each
other in this process. Consequently, many have made a career out of PMSC work, having served
multiple contracts with multiple companies.
Our interviewees received an average monthly wage of US$2,216, although their individual
wages vary signiﬁcantly, from US$724 to US$7,000 (see Table 2). While not all PMSC personnel
are employed for 12 consecutive months, it is worth noting that their pro rata annual income is
about triple Fiji’s average household income (approximately US$8,252 per annum in 2008-2009)
(ADB, n.d.). Given signiﬁcant income differences among individual wages, however, some person-
nel may earn about the same as the average household income.
RISKS AND COSTS OF UNEQUAL “MUSCLE TRADE”
Fraser (2013: 240) highlights the vulnerability of metropolitan PMSC contractors who are left “with
a skill set and a mindset that make re-entry into civilian life difﬁcult.” Our ﬁndings show that
Fijian PMSC workers experience greater vulnerability and exploitation speciﬁc to the dynamics of
core-periphery “muscle trade.”
Socio-economic conditions of the trade
Fijian PMSC workers’ experiences must be understood in the context of local socio-economic con-
ditions that motivate – and necessitate – entry into military labour trade. In the face of scarce
employment opportunities and the absence of state unemployment beneﬁts, those without formal
qualiﬁcations or skills must sustain themselves and their families by any means available. In this
context, PMSC contracts are deemed extremely lucrative. Our interview data suggest that, while
some do not fully understand in advance the extent of the risks of the job, most are clearly aware
TABLE 1
ESTIMATED PMSC PERSONNEL EMIGRATION
Year
Armed Forces
Emigration Total
Peacekeeping
Departures*
British Army
Intake**
Estimated PMSC
Migrants
2006 2176 606 20 1550
2007 2188 606 220 1362
2008 1962 606 140 1216
2009 1662 606 30 1026
2010 1829 606 30 1193
2011 1814 606 60 1148
*RFMF sent 338 peacekeepers to Sinai and 268 to Iraq annually between 2006 and 2012.
**BA intakes are recorded by the ﬁscal year. Here, intake ﬁgures are listed under the calendar years when
the ﬁscal years started. (Sources: Fiji Bureau of Statistics, 2012; RFMF, 2016, personal communication;
BA, 2016, personal communication).
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of it and yet willing and indeed desperate to take a chance in return for a livelihood. Their primary,
and in most cases only, motivation for PMSC migration is ﬁnancial.
In 2004 and 2005, the explosion of PMSC recruitment and the scramble for contracts drew much
public attention. For instance, in 2004, over 300 former soldiers gathered to apply with an American
PMSC (Figure 1), and 520 soldiers and policemen enlisted with another. The desperate pursuit of
contracts was paralleled by recruitment disputes. One particular case became a national controversy.
In 2004, Timoci Lolohea of Meridian Services Agency, claiming to be the agent for Public Ware-
house Company of Kuwait, undertook large-scale recruitment targeting villages, churches and sub-
urbs, charging applicants F$150-fees. In most cases, deployment did not materialise, causing
individuals and villages large ﬁnancial damage. Lolohea reportedly obtained over F$3million (US
$1.4million) from 20,000 people, triggering Ministry of Labour and police investigations. Even as
these disputes unfolded, hundreds of men converged at his ofﬁce, seeking enlistment (Chand, 2011).
Thousands of men (and some women) have thus desperately sought contracts, causing severe
competition: “Every man for himself. The recruiter will give you only one opportunity. Your cell
phone should be with you 24/7. He calls you at a moment’s notice, and you leave. If he calls you,
and you don’t answer, that’s it; you’re done. He goes to the next person” (Epeli). Many are given
little or no pre-deployment training. They are ﬂown out of Fiji as and when companies require
them, often with extraordinarily short notice, in many cases within a day of contract signing. In
short, PMSC labour trade is decidedly a “buyer’s market”, where Fiji provides a large and desper-
ate “reserve army” of military labour and companies dictate terms and conditions. Such power dif-
ferential compels Fijians to bear signiﬁcant costs and risks of the trade.
Financial risks and costs
Despite the perception of large ﬁnancial gains, PMSC remuneration is sometimes considerably
smaller than initially believed or anticipated. There have been media reports of wage disputes,
FIGURE 1
PMSC APPLICANTS
(Source: Fiji Sun, 13 May 2004: 1.)
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which ﬁve of our interviewees experienced themselves. Two did not receive contracts until after
leaving Fiji. Inoke, for instance, had been promised a US$7,000/month salary, but when he and
others were en route to Iraq, US$1,500/month-contracts were distributed aboard the aeroplane.
Others were misled by agents regarding duties, leave provisions and other working conditions.3
These episodes illustrate that the workers’ ability to bargain with PMSCs/agents is undermined by
lack of economic and cultural capital – i.e., their great need to secure a contract, and their lack of
awareness of the importance of scrutinising contract provisions, ability to read English, and/or abil-
ity to comprehend legal language. Agents often “just give us the contract and say ‘Sign.’ It’s like a
stick and carrot thing. They lure you with a carrot and when you get there, the stick is, if you don’t
sign, you are required to ﬂy back to Fiji with no job” (Samuela).
Moreover, PMSC work entails long-term ﬁnancial insecurity repercussions. PMSC contracts are
for ﬁxed periods and may be terminated at any time depending on company circumstances and
other contingencies. This may abruptly leave the workers jobless, despite their attempts to secure
another contract. Consequently, many fall into a cycle of PMSC work for a few months to a few
years, followed by a sometimes-considerable period of unemployment or unskilled employment,
until the next contract is secured. Between/after contracts they typically work as security guards or
taxi drivers in Fiji: Emele’s husband earned F$2.50 (US$1.20) per hour as a security guard at the
time of the interview. In Epeli’s words: “Whatever [we are] making is hand-to-mouth existence.
People think going to Iraq makes millions. No, we don’t! With this kind of contract, you hardly
make just enough for the family to make ends meet, for risking your life.”
Physical risks and costs
In addition to ﬁnancial precariousness, PMSC deployment exposes them to extreme physical risks
and life-threatening situations. As highlighted by Fraser (2013: 547), PMSC personnel, by interna-
tional law, are “neither civilians nor soldiers: they belong to that grey category of unlawful combat-
ants, who are liable to being killed with impunity . . . but are denied the rights and privileges of
soldiers.” All the interviewees were deployed in Iraq’s “red zones” (high-risk areas outside Bagh-
dad’s fortiﬁed, “green zones”) and some in “black zones” (“where all Americans have pulled out”
[Petero]). They experienced frequent, sometimes daily, insurgent attacks including ambushes, road-
side bombs, sniper attacks and mortar bombs on duty or at camps, and some were involved in
combat situations. Furthermore, they undertook their duties under extremely physically demanding
conditions. Convoy drivers were required to drive at 120-190km/hour for up to 7-8 hours without
stopping, to avoid roadside bombs and other attacks. Personal security detail ofﬁcers accompanied
clients in highly volatile areas, deploying defensive ﬁghting positions, which sometimes prevented
them from changing clothes or bathing for several days.
There is great variation in the levels of physical protection provided by PMSCs. Some intervie-
wees were equipped with arms, body armour, and fully protected/armed vehicles, whereas others
were unarmed or entirely without protective gear. Rupeni, for instance, worked as escorting convoy
personnel for the Iraqi currency exchange in unprotected, soft-shell vehicles, from which all doors
had been removed to ease personnel movement, exposing them directly to attacks (see Figure 2).
The same type of vehicle was given to Eroni for personal security detail duties on two separate
contracts in 2006 and in 2009.
All interviewees recalled violent and traumatising situations. Rupeni experienced an ambush, fol-
lowed by half-hour shooting on his way to Basra Airport to return to Fiji. A bomb hit the vehicle
behind him, burning an Iraqi soldier. He was ordered to extinguish the ﬁre on the soldier’s body:
The guy was wiggling on the road, burnt. You could see that underneath the skin was fat. . . In the
midst of the ﬁre and shooting, I took out my gun and a ﬁre extinguisher. I couldn’t crawl, so I
rolled towards him. . . . I could feel splinters of tar seal hit me in the face, so I knew the bullets
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were close enough. I was in a rush to extinguish the ﬁre on him. I managed to extinguish it, but he
died half an hour later. That was my last day. What an ending. . .
Taniela shared his story of witnessing his best friend’s death in a roadside bomb attack:
I’m the one who got him out of the rubble. I carried him, [who was] without legs, half the body
gone, and still alive. . . He was dying in my arms. He showed me his [wedding] ring and said
“Please, my wife.” Then he took off the ring, and died. This was my best friend. We joked all the
time in the camp.
Review of newspaper coverage indicates that 29 Fijian PMSC personnel have died in Iraq since
2004. Numerous others have been injured, including four of our interviewees. PMSC personnel are
typically insured for death but not injury, and therefore not entitled to compensation or continuing
medical treatment. Consequently, Timoci and Petero, who were injured in the leg in mortar bomb
attacks, were only provided with medical treatment immediately after the incidents. Timoci suffers
from pain 10 years later, while Petero walks with a limp and pays for his own medical rehabilita-
tion. Taniela, whose eye was badly injured by a roadside bomb, wears dark glasses at all times due
to strong pain caused by light.
Psychological costs
None of the interviewees’ employers provided counselling or other psychological support. Unlike
post-deployment “decompression” programmes offered to uniformed soldiers, most Fijian PMSC
personnel are ﬂown to Fiji with no such provision and left to their own devices to reintegrate into
civilian life and to cope with the psychological (and physical) effects of deployment.
The psychological effects identiﬁed by the interviewees include: impulsive fast driving, ﬂash-
backs, anxiety, extreme alertness, sleeping difﬁculty, anger management problems, and other symp-
toms of post-traumatic stress disorder. Inoke, who returned from Iraq four years prior to the
interview, explained:
When I left [Fiji], I didn’t have white hair. When I came back, so many – so much stress, so much
worrying. My wife saw me and said, “Hey, is this you?” I don’t sleep well. Like I still recall what
FIGURE 2
CONVOY VEHICLE USED BY FIJIAN PMSC PERSONNEL
(Source: interviewee.)
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happened those nights when I was in the war zone. Sometimes, I sleep with my feet on the [imagi-
nary] accelerator and brakes, and my wife says, “What happened to you? Are you okay?” I was
dreaming I was driving a truck. Still in the war zone.
Jone candidly discussed his struggle, three years after his return:
I have to stop commanding to my children. Things should be done the way I want. If I think they are
late, I whack them. . . Sometimes I talk to my wife as if I am talking to one of my teammates. . . I’ve rea-
lised that that’s not good, because my children are frightened when I talk to them. My wife is not coping.
Like, I’m hyper. When I’m lying down and someone touches me, automatically I jump up. . . Someday,
tension is gonna explode. A lot of bad experience here [pointing to his head]. I know most of the vio-
lence against women and children is because of people working out there without proper counselling. I
admit that myself. . . We’re in a peaceful area now. But it is in my system.
The effects of untreated psychological traumas are thus felt by families/communities. Combined
with ﬁnancial insecurities and husbands’ long-term absence, these have in some cases ended in
marriage/family breakdown.
PRIVATISATION OF MILITARY/SECURITY WORK AND CORE-PERIPHERY
CHAINS OF EXPLOITATION
As illustrated above, Fijians enter into military labour trade in a context of vulnerability, driven by
their need to earn a livelihood in a society with little social protection, where those without formal
skills/qualiﬁcations choose between subsistence farming, low-paid employment, informal employ-
ment, and unemployment. This vulnerability renders them highly susceptible to “coercive offers” of
PMSCs, whereby they are compelled to offer low-cost military labour – remarkably cheaper than
uniformed soldiers or Western PMSC personnel.
The ﬁnancial implications of PMSC employment are not necessarily favourable, as noted above.
Even for those who earn more than the average income, it remains open to question if that is
indeed a “fair” return for undertaking high-risk duties that would otherwise be carried out by
American/coalition soldiers, with much less physical protection, and much less or no compensation
or post-deployment support. While returning soldiers’ post-deployment hardships are widely publi-
cised (e.g. Military.com, 2005), and Western PMSC personnel’s dissatisfaction with “a token effort
at support followed swiftly by abandonment” is documented (Fraser, 2013: 241), most Fijian work-
ers have recourse to no support, entirely left on their own to bear the ﬁnancial, physical and psy-
chological costs of the military labour.
This is particularly conspicuous in cases of injury and death, compared with the protection pro-
vided for soldiers. For instance, the British government provides, for injury or illness, a payment of
£1,200–570,000 (US$1,600–765,000), and for death, a Survivors Guaranteed Income Payment pay-
able for life, a bereavement grant, and a child’s payment (UK Ministry of Defence, 2006). BA sol-
diers killed in action also receive symbolic compensation of formal acknowledgement and
condolences from the highest ofﬁce. The family of a Fijian BA solider killed in Iraq in 2007
received a personal letter from Prince of Wales and messages from Duchess of Cornwall and the
British Prime Minister. The late soldier was accorded a full military funeral in Fiji, with 12 of his
regiment ofﬁcers ﬂown in. By contrast, Asinate, whose husband was killed by a mortar bomb in
Iraq in 2004 on a US$1,500/month contract, received a one-off payment of F$250,000 (US
$120,000) and a single phone call from the company ofﬁce in London. The price of Fijian PMSC
workers’ labour – and indeed lives – is signiﬁcantly cheaper than those of uniformed soldiers.
Their labour is also strikingly cheaper than that of Western PMSC colleagues, who may in fact
command higher salaries than regular soldiers. According to Krahmann (2012), Western PMSC
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personnel in Iraq could earn up to US$200,000 a year, over seven times our interviewees’ average
salary. Our interviewees, like the Gurkhas in Chisholm’s studies (2014a, b), invariably noted such
differential wages: “All the white men – they [PMSCs] paid them good. Us Fijians – they paid us
peanuts. They think we don’t know what the money is worth” (Petero). Inoke, for instance,
received US$1,500/month, in contrast to US$10,000/month paid to American colleagues performing
the same duties. Many also noted differential leave and holiday allocations.
Emerging from this is a picture of a global chain of outsourcing and exploitation of military
labour, with Fijians and possibly other peripheral military migrants at the bottom. The US/coali-
tion governments outsource military labour to PMSCs for political and economic reasons, espe-
cially domestic opposition to national troop deployment in high-conﬂict areas (Brayton, 2002),
and market-based, privatisation and cost-cutting policies (Isenberg, 2009). PMSCs, in turn,
source military labour from not only Western ex-soldiers but also large “reserve armies” of sol-
diers, police ofﬁcers and unemployed men in peripheral societies like Fiji and Nepal. The latter
provide a particularly lucrative labour market for PMSCs for economic and political reasons
similar to those that motivate state outsourcing of military labour. Fijians accept severely
exploitative contract arrangements, which require minimum investment in remuneration, prior
training, physical protection, insurance cover or psychological support. Furthermore, such
arrangement is less likely to invite political scandals or protests than in metropolitan countries.
Fijian government ministers, religious/community leaders, civil society organisations and mass
media voiced their concerns in 2004/2005, leading to government attempts to monitor and regu-
late the recruitment. Subsequently, however, domestic political turmoil, which culminated in a
military coup in 2006 and interim government rule until 2014, preoccupied media, state, and
public attention. Further eclipsing the matter was the declining BA intake in the late 2000s.
PMSC migration hence became marginalised as a policy/media matter and assumed a greater
aspect of inevitability. In short, the economic and political uncertainty and vulnerability of the
country have allowed PMSCs to source military labour on their own terms, with minimal local
resistance or interference.
It is in the context of such unequal trade that PMSCs have grown into a vastly proﬁtable industry.
Global Risk, the key PMSC employer of Fijians, reportedly had a US$4.5 million/month contract
with the American Coalition Provision Authority in 2005. In 2008 American agencies awarded US
$85billion for military/security contracts in Iraqi (Isenberg, 2009). The industry presents typical
characteristics of core-peripheral labour trade, whereby transnational PMSCs seek out peripheral
countries with required labour as well as political challenges and weak economic conditions for
proﬁt maximisation.
PMSC MIGRANT AGENCY
While Fijians are subjected to inequities of the core-periphery military labour trade, our intervie-
wees showed that they are far from helpless or unknowing victims. First, they are critically aware
of their own geopolitical structural position and the disparity inherent in the trade. Inoke, among
many, noted:
You know why [Fijians are paid less]? Because Fijian people, African people, Filipinos – we are
Third World countries. Cheap labour. That’s why they send [the agent] to come and look for labour
in Fiji. How come these [Western] people doing the same job are getting more, and we are getting
less? It’s like our life is cheaper than their life, yeah.
Second, their decision to enter into PMSC trade is a rational one, based on conscious choice of a
livelihood for themselves and their families over risks. As discussed, many are acutely aware of the
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severity of possible consequences, yet resolute in their decision to take on the unfair system, nego-
tiate its costs and bear its risks to secure an income. While this is clearly a manifestation of struc-
tural coercion, it also reﬂects their conscious engagement with the system, even if it may be a
“losing battle” in the ﬁnal analysis.
Third, they demonstrate collective resilience in the face of overwhelming adversities. Their reso-
lution to get through PMSC work is propelled by mobilisation of pride in Fiji’s martial tradition,
similar to the way Gurkha PMSC personnel draw strength from the colonially-constructed Gurkha
identity as a “martial race” (Chisholm, 2014b). As Jone explained: “Fijian soldiers – not only sol-
diers – any Fijian is a warrior. The technical things, the procedures of war, these things they
[PMSCs] have now were in Fiji before Christ came”. They also employ culturally-embedded strate-
gies to cope with deployment challenges. In addition to regular devotions they organise, with some
taking turns in acting as “the pastor of the day,” talanoa (storytelling), drinking yaqona4 together,
laughing and joking, which play a pivotal role in strengthening relationships and mutual sharing in
Fijian culture, work as coping mechanisms (Figure 3). Samuela explained that, although radio was
to be used for operational news only, “half the time, Fijian boys were chatting over the radio” in
Fijian. They joked together in some of the most extreme situations: “Especially in war zones like
that, joking carried us through.”
Importantly, this discussion does not trivialise their afﬂiction but illuminates their ability to exer-
cise their agency even under the most onerous, exploitative conditions. They employ these strate-
gies to collectively negotiate the hardships of deployment in the absence of formal protection/
support, although this does not diminish the oppressive nature of their circumstances. The price
they pay, often privately and silently, was captured by Salote, who said her husband “really wanted
FIGURE 3
COPING WITH PMSC WORK THE FIJIAN WAY
“No, boss. Everything is fine here… just like home!”
“Another round of yaqona.”
“Yes.”
(Source: Fiji Sun, 13 October 2004: 6.)
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us to have a good life. Whenever he called [on Skype] he always wanted to speak to my eldest
child. . . Whenever they spoke, I saw him on the camera, I saw tears dropping down his face.”
Their unspoken tribulation, as well as determination, were also illustrated by Eroni, who recounted
saying to his doctor when he applied for his third contract, which was cut short due to a serious ill-
ness: “Just sign this [medical certiﬁcate], because it’s good for me to go and die there [if] my fam-
ily get money [rather] than I’m dying here and they receive no money. Sir, just sign. Let me go.
Better for me to die but give them something than die here with nothing.”
CONCLUSIONS
This article has outlined the possible scale, processes and impacts of Fijian PMSC personnel migra-
tion as well as the migrants’ experiences of and responses to PMSC employment. Fijian PMSC
personnel migration started around the early 2000s and expanded rapidly through mass recruitment,
which is estimated to have sent over 1,000 Fijians annually to Iraq and other high-conﬂict areas.
Our ﬁndings show this is an instance of unequal labour trade that takes place in a broader context
of global “muscle trade.” Against a backdrop of increasing neoliberal privatisation, states outsource
military labour required in conﬂict-affected areas from PMSCs as an economically and politically
expedient solution. PMSCs in turn source necessary military labour from: 1) ex-Special Force and
other ex-personnel of metropolitan militaries; and 2) large and desperate “reserve armies” of ex-dis-
ciplinary force personnel and unemployed men in peripheral societies. Whilst Western ex-soldiers
are vulnerable to PMSCs’ coercive offers due to their socio-economic disadvantages, Fijians are
doubly exploited due to their vulnerability speciﬁc to core-periphery power imbalances. PMSCs
offer them markedly lower wages and make minimum investment in their prior training, physical
protection, insurance cover and post-service psychological support, compelling them to bear signiﬁ-
cant ﬁnancial, physical, and psychological risks and costs of military labour.
These ﬁndings add to the emerging literature on PMSC labour recruitment from the global South,
which has, to date, centred on Gurkhas, exploratory and empirical insights into the experiences of
Fijians – another key group of peripheral military/security labourers. Due to the country’s economic
vulnerability resulting in Fijian men’s desperate pursuit of employment and long-term political
instability obscuring the severity and magnitude of the costs of the trade, PMSC recruitment has
become a decidedly “buyers’ market” with Fiji positioned as a supplier of cheap and subordinate
military/security labour. This also bears some theoretical implications for it illuminates the continuing
relevance of politico-economic models in understanding contemporary labour migrations, despite the
recent tendency among researchers and policymakers to focus on migration beneﬁts, by showing
that Fijian PMSC migration is indeed an instance – perhaps a quintessential one – of unequal core-
periphery labour trade. The core-periphery model is useful in understanding Fijians’ location on the
global private military/security supply chains and how this locks them into relations of exploitation
and abuse over which they have little control.
Our ﬁndings also illuminate the agency of Fijian military migrants who engage with the unequal
trade in a conscious, resolute and even resilient manner. Migration literature provides abundant
documentation of the varied and creative ways in which migrant workers negotiate, circumvent
and/or resist exploitative labour trade. In particular, migrant workers have been shown to employ a
variety of strategies to establish informal networks and communities of support for each other via
mobile phones (Law and Peng, 2008), shared Sunday activities (Lan, 2003) and conversations
across balconies (in the case of domestic workers) (Pande, 2012) to name a few. The case of Fijian
PMSC workers presents another informal yet notable strategy for migrant worker agency. Aware of
their marginal geopolitical position and their vulnerability, they actively (and often desperately)
submit themselves to the trade, but with critical consciousness. They also mobilise culturally-
embedded strategies, ranging from embracing Fijian warrior identity and religiosity to joking,
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laughing and drinking yaqona together to cope with imminent risks and the absence of protection/
support provision. In this context, Fijians are not only victims of the global chain of military labour
outsourcing and exploitation, but also knowledgeable and competent actors who take on the muscle
trade system by mobilising a range of personal, collective, and cultural resources.
Our exploratory research is intended as a contribution towards a greater understanding of both
the structural dynamics of this growing and consequential labour trade and the agency of human
subjects demonstrated even under most powerful structural constraints. Although this article
focused on Fiji, the dynamics of the trade discussed here may apply to other cases of military/secu-
rity migrants from the global South.
NOTES
1. In this article, we use the term “private military and security company personnel” rather than “mercenary”,
while acknowledging the debates over the deﬁnitions of these terms (Krahmann, 2012), due to PMSCs’ dis-
tinctive, corporate nature.
2. “Operation ICE” or the Iraqi Currency Exchange refers to the Coalition Provisional Authority’s replacement
of the Iraqi currency between October 2003 and January 2004. It involved large-scale security services for
the transportation of money to banks around Iraq (Coalition Provisional Authority, 2004).
3. There is great variation in leave provisions, ranging in our interviewees’ cases from a three-month-work
and one-month-leave cycle to a 12-month-work and one-month-leave cycle. During deployment, most inter-
viewees were allowed holidays with varying intervals, but one worked 12 hours every day for three years
as a military truck driver. There is less variation in insurance provisions. PMSC personnel are typically
insured for death but not for injury.
4. Yaqona refers to the plant piper methysticum and the drink made from it, which has much ceremonial/social
signiﬁcance in Fijian society.
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